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ABSTRACT 
We construct a hybrid, economic indicator of the sustainability of global well-being, which is more 
inclusive than existing indicators and incorporates an environmentally pessimistic, physical 
constraint on global warming.  Our methodology extends the World Bank’s Adjusted Net Saving 
(ANS) indicator to include the cost of population growth, the benefit of technical progress, and a 
much higher, precautionary cost of current CO2 emissions.  Future warming damage is so highly 
unknowable that valuing emissions directly is rather arbitrary, so we use a novel, inductive 
approach: we modify damage and climate parameters in the deterministic DICE climate-economy 
model so it becomes economically optimal to control emissions in a way likely to limit warming to 
an agreed target, here 2 oC.  If future emissions are optimally controlled, our ANS then suggests 
that current global well-being is sustainable.  But if emissions remain uncontrolled, our base-case 
ANS is negative now and our corresponding, modified DICE model has an unsustained 
development path, with well-being peaking in 2065.  Current ANS on an uncontrolled path may 
thus be a useful heuristic indicator of future unsustainability.  Our inductive method might allow 
ANS to include other very hard-to-value, environmental threats to global sustainability, like 
biodiversity loss and nitrogen pollution.	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1.  Introduction 
 
Are current levels of global human well-being sustainable for at least a century, if 
depletion of the planet’s environmental resources is optimally controlled in future?  Is 
rising global well-being unsustainable for another century or so, if business-as-usual 
trends in largely uncontrolled depletion of environmental resources continue?  Asking 
these two questions about global sustainability tackles one of humanity’s most 
complex and persistent debates, where most contributions (e.g., Meadows et al., 1972; 
Nordhaus, 1973) belong to one of two opposing paradigms (Neumayer, 2013).  The 
first paradigm can be broadly labelled “substitutability” (of human-made inputs for 
environmental resource inputs in producing output and well-being), “weak 
sustainability”,1 or “environmental optimism”, though these labels do not have 
identical meanings.  The second can be broadly labelled “non-substitutability”, 
“strong sustainability”, or “environmental pessimism”.  A key reason why they 
persistently disagree is that “support for one paradigm or the other depends much on 
basic beliefs ... that are non-falsifiable and cannot therefore be conclusively decided” 
(Neumayer, 2013: 3).  We therefore use “optimism” and “pessimism” here purely 
non-judgmentally, just to describe the paradigms. 
 
Because of these non-falsifiable disagreements, some authorities recommend 
informing policy debates by presenting multiple sustainability indicators from 
different paradigms (e.g., Stiglitz et al., 2009).  As an alternative, we make a first 
attempt at developing here a single, policy-relevant, empirical indicator of global 
sustainability, that is more inclusive than existing indicators in three ways.  First, it 
includes more determinants of global sustainability than have yet been combined in 
any single indicator.  Second, it includes elements of both optimistic and pessimistic 
paradigms, and so in some sense attempts to bridge the gulf between them in order to 
better inform policy-makers, who cannot subscribe to different planets like academics 
subscribe to different paradigms.  Third, our indicator can be applied to both our 
                                                
1 An even “weaker” paradigm is mainstream growth economics, which almost completely ignores 
environmental resources.  For instance, only one paper (Brock and Taylor, 2010) out of 121 during 
2004-13 in the prestigious Journal of Economic Growth considered global warming or energy inputs. 
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opening questions, about global sustainability under optimal control, or under 
negligible future control, of the environment. 
 
Our focus on building a single, inclusive, and policy-relevant indicator leads us to 
use a novel, experimental methodology, which is perhaps more the contribution of 
this paper than the particular numerical results shown here.  We change and extend 
the empirical indicator of global sustainability that is already most inclusive and 
policy-relevant.  This is the global result for the World Bank’s Adjusted Net Savings 
(ANS, also known as Genuine Saving) indicator, which the Bank estimates for over 
120 countries (World Bank, 2006, 2011).  Derived from conventional, “weak” 
economic theory, ANS estimates how well any society is currently maintaining all its 
human-made and natural assets.  ANS assumes smooth substitutability among and 
optimal control of all inputs, which allows it to serve as a sustainability indicator, 
albeit an inexact one (Hamilton, 1994; Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Pezzey, 2004), 
where sustainability is defined as society being able to sustain current, average well-
being indefinitely (Pezzey, 1997).  Our global application of this definition ignores 
the requirement for more equity within and between nations that many authors 
consider a vital part of sustainable development, and avoids the need to consider 
international trade.  We also ignore possible non-environmental impacts on long-run 
global well-being, such as from nuclear war, disease, or asteroids. 
 
Data and computational limits mean that the World Bank does not estimate ANS 
from a separate, complete empirical model for each country.  Instead, each estimate is 
a hybrid: it adds together direct valuations from different sources, using market-based 
prices (including discount rates) if available, and modelling results if not, a process 
which inevitably entails broad approximations and many omissions.  Our indicator 
hybridizes World Bank ANS further, by replacing its (weak, optimistic) valuation of 
the current CO2 emissions causing future global warming with much higher, 
precautionary valuations.  We calculate these valuations by backwards induction from 
a physical (strong, pessimistic) target of limiting warming to the globally agreed 
Copenhagen 2 oC limit (UN, 2009).  However, discount rates in our inductive method 
are still market-based and very similar to the World Bank’s.  In that sense we are 
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interpreting the 2 oC limit as meaning the aim of climate policy is to protect future 
generations from global warming damage, rather than to increase general 
intergenerational concern.  The second interpretation merits further research but is 
beyond our scope here. 
 
In addition to changing the World Bank’s CO2 valuation for ANS, we also extend 
their ANS by including fairly conventional estimates of the cost of exogenous 
population growth, currently not reported globally, and the benefit of exogenous 
technical progress, currently omitted.  According to these estimates, the sustainability 
cost of population growth, assumed to be at a constant rate, is generally outweighed 
by the sustainability benefit of technical progress.  Our modifications to ANS are thus 
not a uniform shift towards environmental pessimism.  And our two extensions would 
be impossible to make with pessimistic, biophysical, “strong” indicators of global 
environmental impacts, such as the Ecological Footprint or Living Planet Index (e.g., 
WWF, 2012), Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production (e.g., Krausmann et 
al., 2013), or Energy Return On Investment (e.g., Gagnon et al., 2009).  These were 
never designed to include all determinants of well-being, and cannot be extended to 
do so. 
 
 As detailed later, our precautionary, inductive method for revaluing CO2 
emissions entails finding parameters for climate damage, climate sensitivity, and non-
CO2 radiative forcing that will, in a deterministic, integrated assessment (global 
climate-economy) model (IAM), make it economically optimal to control emissions 
enough to be likely (give about a two-thirds chance, reflecting moderate risk aversion) 
to limit peak global warming to 2 oC.2  The IAM we use is a modified version of 
DICE-2007, Nordhaus’s (2008) version of his Dynamic Integrated model of Climate 
and the Economy, hereafter DICE or standard DICE unless ambiguity arises.  
Inductive approaches have been used before in climate economics to induce model 
parameters from policy goals, for example by Gjerde et al. (1999), though they 
included the well-being (pure time) discount rate as one of the parameters modified.   
                                                
2 Other warming limits could readily be used with our approach, and may need to be, given the ever-
increasing difficulty of staying within 2 oC (e.g., Guivarch and Hallegatte, 2013). 
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Running the base case of our inductively modified DICE model with either optimal 
control or no control of CO2 emissions then yields two very different social costs of 
current CO2 emissions (SCCs): $131 per ton of carbon (/tC) under optimal control, 
and $1,455/tC under no control, where “$” always means US2005$.  These are much 
higher than DICE or World Bank SCCs; but our no-control SCC is exceeded by some 
in the economics literature (e.g., ~$94,000/tC in Howarth et al., 2014), and by the 
infinite SCC implied by the absolute “non-substitutability” language used in most 
“strong sustainability” literature.  Our modified DICE also yields two valuations of 
technical progress, and inserting these and the CO2 valuations into an extended World 
Bank ANS addresses, though unsurprisingly does not answer conclusively, our two 
opening questions about global sustainability. 
 
Throughout the paper we discuss the validity of different parts of our 
methodology.  In particular, our use of induction in a deterministic IAM to revalue 
CO2 emissions is contentious enough to warrant extensive discussion below, with a 
summary here.  We judge that the World Bank’s SCC of $24.5/tC is inconsistent with 
recent warnings from climate scientists about dangerous global warming, and so 
should be replaced with a more precautionary value.  But we depart from the 
conventional view that economic modelling should be used to estimate directly how 
much warming should be permitted, because of a second judgment, that climate 
damage is highly, but not absolutely, unknowable, especially at high warming levels.  
All climate damage functions in existing IAMs therefore use essentially arbitrary 
guesswork at high warming levels.  So inducing an SCC from the knowledge inherent 
in the consensus 2 oC target is not necessarily any less coherent, and is worth trying as 
an alternative.  And our somewhat paradoxical use of a deterministic IAM, despite 
high unknowability, makes our key assumptions easier to find and contend than if we 
used a more complex, probabilistic IAM.   
 
Inductive valuation also opens the important possibility of including in ANS other 
“strong”, physical limits to global sustainability, such as the “planetary boundaries” 
for biodiversity loss or for human conversion of atmospheric nitrogen to reactive 
forms, about which Earth system scientists have expressed great concern (Rockstrom 
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et al., 2009), but whose dollar value is also highly unknowable.  Our approach can 
thus also be seen as a new hybrid sustainability indicator which applies the concept of 
Critical Natural Capital globally, to add to the rather different hybrids reviewed by 
Dietz and Neumayer (2007).  
 
Other inductive methodologies and other models could of course have been 
chosen, and will be discussed briefly later.  A broader, non-inductive and altogether 
more ambitious alternative would be to set aside the World Bank’s ANS and develop 
a fuller, unified empirical model of global development, perhaps by adding minerals 
and energy depletion, various uncertainties and other features to DICE, and then using 
this fuller model to directly forecast well-being and sustainability.  We do not attempt 
this for two reasons.  First, it would require much further research, well beyond our 
scope here, and a climate damage function would still have to be guessed somehow.  
Second, by modifying the World Bank’s ANS, we address policy-makers more 
directly than by deriving an ANS solely from an academic model.  Overall, we 
contend that our hybrid, “weak/strong” approach, the first to include exogenous 
technical progress and an environmental constraint in a single-number indicator of the 
sustainability of global well-being, is an experiment well worth trying, in keeping 
with the transdisciplinary and methodologically open spirit of this journal. 
 
We proceed as follows.  Section 2 notes opposing views on the importance of CO2 
emissions, and explains further why we use induction to replace the World Bank’s 
CO2 valuation.  Section 3 summarizes the theory of ANS, the current empirical 
practice of World Bank ANS, and literature stemming from Dasgupta and Mäler 
(2000) that uses an alternative, instantaneous definition of sustainability.  Section 4 
explains why we chose DICE-2007 instead of another IAM, how we modified it 
inductively to give our precautionary CO2 valuations, and how we included 
population growth and technical progress in ANS.  Section 5 gives our modified ANS 
results and sensitivity testing.  Section 6 considers whether our inductive approach 
might be used to include other global environmental threats, like biodiversity loss and 
atmospheric nitrogen conversion, in ANS.  Section 7 concludes. 
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2.  The case for an inductive, precautionary valuation of the social cost of CO2 
 
2.1. Optimistic versus pessimistic views on the importance of CO2 emissions 
 
 The World Bank (2011: 78) reported the wide range of SCCs found by Tol’s 
(2005) survey, from −9.5 to 350 US2005$/tC at his 5th and 95th percentiles 
respectively.  The World Bank then chose an SCC of $24.5/tC, based on Fankhauser 
(1994), which values CO2 emissions during 1975-2008 at 0.4-0.5% of global gross 
domestic product (GDP).  This small value appears in Fig. 1 as the narrow gap 
between the two graphs for global ANS during this period, which ignore or include 
the CO2 deduction.  As noted below in Section 4.1, $24.5/tC is close to DICE’s 
optimal SCC and is a key reason for our choosing DICE.  It is thus also consistent 
with DICE’s associated, non-optimal scenario, where warming reaches 6.1 oC if 
emissions remain uncontrolled for 250 years, yet average well-being, our term for 
Nordhaus’s (2008: 39) “generalized consumption per person”, still grows 19-fold, to 
only ~10% less than the hypothetical 21-fold growth that would occur without the 
resulting climate damage. 
 
Such minimal projected damage to well-being is in stark contrast to increasingly 
strong warnings by climate scientists about dangerous global warming (e.g., Hansen 
et al., 2008, 2012; Smith et al., 2009), and also to the importance of CO2 suggested by 
the pessimistic, “strong sustainability” indicators in Fig. 2.  These show the trends of 
global Ecological Reserve – defined as [Biocapacity minus Ecological Footprint] 
divided by Biocapacity, and also known as “ecological overshoot” when negative –
ignoring or including deductions for CO2 emissions (the Carbon Footprint).  The 
popular and influential Ecological Footprint adds up “the area required to produce the 
resources people consume [and] the area occupied by infrastructure” (WWF, 2012), 
so Ecological Reserve does not claim to be a society-wide sustainability indicator, and 
is not quantitatively comparable with ANS.  Nevertheless, both indicators claim to 
indicate unsustainability when negative, so they are comparable in terms of sign and 
trend, and to that extent they disagree strongly.   We next consider in detail the 
difficulty in resolving scientifically such deep disagreements about the importance of 
CO2 to sustainability. 
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Fig. 1. Global Adjusted Net Saving (ANS), 1975-2008.  Both series exclude small deductions 
for particulates emissions.  Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
 
2.2. The high unknowability of future climate damage, and the case for our inductive 
valuation of CO2 emissions 
 
Since at least the seminal work of Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991), many writers 
about global, long-term environmental issues have stressed the deep uncertainties 
involved, and the resulting difficulties for analyzing such issues using normal 
scientific methods.  But explicit discussion of the fundamental obstacles causing such 
uncertainties is rare (e.g., by Baer and Risbey, 2009).  We highlight them here to 
support our view that future climate damage is, and will very probably remain, 
unknowable to a high enough degree to justify valuing CO2 emissions inductively, so 
as to make use of the limited information embodied in the agreed, known 2 oC target. 
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Fig. 2. Global Ecological Footprint data shown as Ecological Reserve, 1975-2008.  Source: 
Global Footprint Network (www.footprintnetwork.org). 
 
Because the Earth is unique in its complex geophysical and biological systems, 
controlled global experiments are impossible.  Comparisons with Venus’s greenhouse 
effect, palaeoclimatic studies, and natural experiments like volcanic eruptions, can all 
provide important insights into the Earth’s climate system, but cannot definitively 
constrain its future behaviour.  Humanity’s disturbances to the Earth’s systems 
continue at unprecedented levels (Steffen et al., 2004), and their final effects will not 
be known for centuries, if only because of the thermal inertia of oceans and ice-sheets 
(Lenton et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2011).  Modelling future physical changes in 
climate thus strains normal scientific methods to the limit; but estimating future 
climate damage also needs to gauge the interaction of physical changes with an 
unprecedented human population.  History is of limited use: the growing evidence of 
severe impacts of climate change on past societies (e.g., McMichael, 2012) cannot 
yield a monetary estimate of future climate damage in a globalized economy with 8 or 
9 billion people.  Thus uniqueness, complexity, centuries-long time delays and the 
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human dimension combine to generate severe, scientifically unresolvable (non-
falsifiable) disagreements about estimating future climate damage, which are very 
unlikely to be much reduced by learning over coming decades. 
 
Our specific focus here is on disagreements about the damage function, defined 
here as the proportion ω of global economic output lost by contemporaneous global 
warming of T oC above the pre-industrial global temperature, or its complement, the 
net-of-damage function Ω(T).  A common formula, used here, is 
ω(T)  :=  1 – Ω(T)  =  aTN / (1 + aTN);    a, N  > 0.     (1) 
There are many disagreements about other climate parameters, notably climate 
sensitivity (the equilibrium global warming caused by doubling greenhouse gas 
concentration, e.g., Weitzman, 2009, 2012), and growing criticisms of the assumption 
in (1) that damage depends only on contemporaneous warming (e.g., Stern, 2013; Cai 
et al., 2013).  However, disagreements about ω(T) form our main reason for using 
induction. 
 
Conventional IAMs, including that in Stern (2007), use optimistic ω(T)’s, 
estimated for a given warming (typically 2.5 and 3 oC) and then extrapolated, often 
using an assumed quadratic form, to much higher temperatures (Tol, 2009; Aldy et al., 
2010).  This yields direct disagreement with more pessimistic ω(T)’s at “super-
extreme” and “extreme” warming (say T ≈ 12 and T ≈ 6).  For example, DICE’s 
ω(T) = 0.0028388T2 / (1 + 0.0028388T2)                 (2) 
(Nordhaus, 2007) has ω(12) = 29% and ω(6) = 9%, whereas Weitzman (2012) has 
ω(12) = 99% and ω(6) = 50%.  Disagreement among economists about ω(T) at 
merely “high” warming (say T ≈ 3) is less marked.  Nevertheless, most non-economist 
supporters of a 2 oC warming limit still regard 3 oC as very dangerous; yet DICE’s 
ω(3) is only 2.5%, close to the best-fit values estimated in Tol’s (2009, 2012) meta-
analyses of 13 other models, and equal to only around one lost year of consumption 
growth. 
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Can elicitation of expert judgment settle such disputes?  Expert elicitation is often 
used to make subjective estimates of probabilities of future outcomes in climate 
science, for example by Lenton et al. (2008) and Kriegler et al. (2009) for a range of 
climate tipping points; but its only application to climate damage was by Nordhaus 
(1994).3  His results were used for calculating DICE’s expected value of climate 
catastrophe, and for example by Mastrandrea and Schneider (2004) to construct a 
damage probability distribution.  His study had only 19 participants from three high-
income countries and has not been repeated, so it would need updating and improving 
– and would still face the fundamental obstacles already noted – if expert elicitation is 
to play any future role in climate damage estimation. 
 
Given this lack of data, all IAMs so far have had to use guesswork as the basis for 
damage functions at higher temperatures.  Dietz et al.’s (2007: 314-5) parameters for 
both non-catastrophic and catastrophic climate damage were “essentially assumed” or 
“genuine guesstimates”.  Ackerman et al. (2010) used ω(T) = .0028388TN / 
(1+.0028388TN) with N ranging stochastically from 1 to 5, but they called this choice, 
and DICE’s N = 2 in (2), “arbitrary” and “fact-free” because “there is essentially no 
relevant empirical research” (p. 1662).  Similar language occurs in Dietz (2011: 523), 
Weitzman (2012: 234) and Dietz and Asheim (2012: 328), and supports a stronger 
criticism that directly estimated IAM damage functions “are completely made up, 
with no theoretical or empirical foundation” (Pindyck, 2013: 870). The problem is 
unavoidable, though not explicitly discussed, even in the most sophisticated recent 
probabilistic models, for example Cai et al. (2013), who show the large effect on 
SCCs of both risk aversion and irreversible shocks in climate damage.  For although 
probabilistic IAMs typically include uncertainty in the damage function, they still face 
the high unknowability of the function’s probability distribution.  We conclude that 
estimating a precautionary valuation of CO2 by backwards, deterministic induction 
from a globally agreed warming limit like 2oC is not in principle any less coherent or 
more contentious than direct, probabilistic valuations which cannot avoid using rather 
                                                
3 Weitzman (2012) cited Kriegler et al.’s expert elicitation of probabilities for climate tipping points as 
rough evidence for his choice of ω(6), but such evidence that ω(6) = 50% instead of, say, 30% or 70%, 
is very indirect. 
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arbitrary guesswork for key parameters, and is worth exploring as an alternative way 
of dealing with underlying non-falsifiability.  Using a CO2 valuation induced from a 
“strong” warming limit might also give our modified ANS indicator more credibility 
with some sustainability pessimists and environmental policy-makers. 
 
Such induction can, however, use many different methods and/or models.  In 
particular, some readers may find implausible our assumption that a 2 oC warming 
limit is optimal under standard discount rates.  Many IAMs have instead assumed 
higher intergenerational concern than implied by standard discounting, for example as 
lower discount rates in Stern (2007), or as an ethical constraint like Dietz and 
Asheim’s (2012) Sustainable Discounted Utilitarianism.  An alternative would thus be 
to vary such concern, but not DICE’s damage function, inductively to find what 
makes a given warming limit optimal.  As noted earlier, this alternative deserves 
further research, but here we focus on higher climate damage and keep the World 
Bank’s practice of using market prices, including discount rates, where possible. 
 
A complementary alternative, also deserving further research, would be to use 
induction in recent, probabilistic IAMs like Dietz and Asheim (2012) and Cai et al. 
(2013).4  This could include risk aversion directly, rather than indirectly by our 
precautionary recalibration of standard, deterministic DICE, and these models’ results 
can depart significantly from deterministic models’.  But such complex models are at 
the frontiers of what is computationally possible, so adding induction would make 
tractability challenging.  Our use of a simpler, deterministic model allows a sharper 
focus on why and how we use induction to tackle the high unknowability of climate 
damage. 
 
Irrespective of whether alternative, precautionary CO2 valuations are found 
directly or inductively, using them to replace the existing valuation in World Bank 
ANS raises further questions about our methodology, addressed at the end of the next 
subsection. 
                                                
4 Also Howarth et al (2014), if its saving and emissions control rates are endogenized so that optimal 
control paths can be found. 
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3. Theory and practice of Adjusted Net Saving (ANS) 
 
3.1. Theory 
 
As currently estimated by the World Bank (2011, 2013), ANS for a geographical 
region is: 
basic ANS  = KP !!!! .:...2211 =+++ jj KPKPKP ,      (3) 
usually reported as a percentage of output, to make results comparable across time 
and regions.  Here K!!!! :),...,,( 21 =jKKK  are the region’s net investments (rates of 
change over time t, with iK!  ≡ dKi / dt) in j stocks of manufactured, human, 
knowledge, and foreign capital, and of environmental resources (also known as 
natural capital), whose use affects the possibilities for human well-being.  
P:),...,,( 21 =jPPP  are rental prices, which measure the social benefits (discounted 
dollar values over the rest of time, some of them negative, i.e. costs) of unit net 
investments now in each stock; and the assumption of smooth substitutability, no 
matter how limited, means that all prices are in principle finite.  So K includes both 
economic (owned) stocks like manufactured capital and fossil fuels, where rental 
prices Pi can be estimated from market prices; and environmental (unowned) stocks 
like CO2, where shadow rental prices must be estimated by environmental economists, 
with difficulties in estimating Pi for CO2 already discussed above. 
 
 By allowing for exogenous population growth and technical progress, subject to 
many restrictive conditions, Pezzey (2004) proved a one-sided theoretical link 
between an extended form of ANS and sustainability in an “optimal” economy: one 
which maximizes welfare W{L(t)u(t)} over the entire future, where L(t) is population 
and u(t) is well-being (utility) per person.  If n is the (constant) rate of population 
growth, x(t) is the per-person benefit of future, exogenous technical progress that 
results just from time passing, * denotes optimal values, and um(K(t)) is the maximum 
utility sustainable forever starting from capital stocks K(t), the link is that: 
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 extended ANS : )()(         )(*).(    )(*).(  txtLttntt +−= KPKP !               ≤ 0 
      basic              deduction for        addition for 
      ANS          exogenous        exogenous 
                            population growth    technical progress 
 ⇒  u*(t)     >   um(K*(t))         (4) 
      current utility >   maximum sustainable utility;    i.e., economy is unsustainable at t. 
(See Appendix A for details.)  However, current, extended ANS being positive does 
not mean current well-being is sustainable.  The intuition for this one-sidedness is that 
optimality entails no concern for sustainability as defined here.  Indeed, optimality 
may directly cause an unsustained development path if non-renewable resource 
depletion is essential for an economy (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Pezzey and 
Withagen, 1998); and high optimal resource depletion rates, iK! , can drive optimal 
rental prices iP  (estimated from observed market prices) far below their “sustainability 
prices” (Pezzey and Toman, 2002). 
 
 Among the key restrictions needed for (4) to hold (again see Appendix A) are that 
n is exogenous and constant, as just noted; u depends only on per-person levels, C/L, 
of an extended consumption vector C; and the economy’s production possibilities 
have constant returns to scale.  All these restrictions are inevitably broken by real-
world conditions.  The population growth rate “is not and cannot be” forever constant 
in practice (Arrow et al., 2003).5  The effect of any public, environmental good in C 
on individual well-being u is not diluted by growth in population L.  Globally 
important environmental resources do not exhibit constant returns to scale, because 
                                                
5 We find later that in our modified DICE, average well-being falls far below its optimal path when 
emissions are uncontrolled, so one might expect this to affect population.  However, underlying growth 
in productivity means that well-being stays forever above its initial, 2005 level even on the 
uncontrolled path, thus giving no reason to suppose that starvation would check population growth.  So 
it is unclear if uncontrolled emissions would lower, or raise, population in a more detailed model with 
endogenous population. 
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the global environment cannot be replicated.6  Nevertheless, (4) is the only known 
theoretical connection between extended ANS and our sustainability definition.7  The 
population term nP.K in (4) is the “Malthusian term” already calculated in World 
Bank (2006, Appendix 4; 2011, Appendix E) for selected countries, but not connected 
directly to sustainability or added up globally.  There is no good, practical alternative 
to the World Bank’s calculation method, reviewed in Section 4.3 below.  That 
subsection and Appendix B also explain how we calculated the technical progress 
term x.  Lx was once estimated to add about 40 percentage points of output to US 
ANS (Weitzman, 1997), a large result which motivates its inclusion here. 
 
 Further questions, more specific to this paper’s methodology, arise from our 
insertion below into World Bank ANS of the two very different SCCs derived from 
optimal and no-control runs of our modified DICE.  All observed prices and quantities 
used in World Bank ANS come from economies that are essentially uncontrolled with 
regard to the global natural environment.  So our result that the no-control SCC is far 
greater than the optimal SCC means that some optimal (non-CO2) prices and 
quantities must be rather different from observed prices and quantities, which reduces 
the accuracy of our estimate of optimal ANS.  As for uncontrolled ANS, this has no 
formal theoretical link with sustainability, given the optimality needed for (4) to hold, 
so it can be regarded as only a heuristic indicator of global sustainability.  But there is 
no alternative sustainability theory available to avoid these shortcomings, which are 
quite unrelated to our use of induction, and would arise from using SCCs from any 
other IAMs with widely different optimal and no-control SCCs. 
 
                                                
6 Also, constant returns to scale requires that one can assign meaning to a zero capital stock for each Ki, 
which is effectively impossible for knowledge and environmental stocks.  We thank a referee for noting 
this, and the previous point on population endogeneity. 
7 Both Arrow et al. (2003) and Asheim (2004) gave formulae for extended ANS when the population 
growth is not constant, but both omitted the non-autonomous case and gave no connection to 
sustainability as defined here. 
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3.2. World Bank practice 
 
The World Bank uses no formal, explicit definition of sustainability, but seems to 
use the definition in (4), judging by the following: “The rule for interpreting ANS is 
simple: if ANS is negative, then we are running down our capital stocks and future 
well-being will suffer; if ANS is positive, then we are adding to wealth and future 
well-being” (World Bank 2011: 19).  This statement overlooks the one-sidedness of 
result (4).  It also overlooks the fact that if wealth is viewed as P.K, the value of an 
economy’s entire stocks, then the change in wealth over time is KPKP .. !! + , that is, 
ANS, KP !. , plus the capital gains KP.!  resulting from real price changes P! .  But 
despite these oversights, the Bank’s sustainability motivation for measuring ANS is 
clear. 
 
 Table 1 lists the World Bank’s basic global ANS components in 2005, our year of 
calculation for data reasons to be given in Section 4.3.  Aggregation over countries 
uses market exchange rates (with no equity weightings), but using purchasing-power-
parity rates makes little difference.  The World Bank reports ANS as a percentage of 
global gross national income, which differs from global GDP, our measure of output, 
by only minor statistical errors.  The 9.3% ANS result in Table 1 is little publicized, 
but it suggests no general concern for future global well-being, despite the overall 
ANS decline since 1975 shown in Fig. 1. 
 
The omissions here of population growth and technical progress are addressed 
below in Section 4.3.  Practical difficulties in measuring many components in Table 1 
are discussed by the World Bank (2011: 21-23); the Bank’s results are frequently 
revised; and some important global environmental threats like biodiversity loss and 
nitrogen pollution are extremely hard to value and therefore omitted. 
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Table 1.  World Bank (2013) global Adjusted Net Saving (ANS) components in 2005 
 
Components, },...,{ 11 jj KPKP !!  Size (as % of 
global GDP) 
Net saving (gross saving, assumed to be invested in manufactured capital, 
minus depreciation of that capital) 
  8.7% 
Public education spending (a proxy for investment in human capital)   4.3% 
Market valuations of: 
    Depletion of fossil-fuel energy 
    Depletions of 10 minerals including phosphate 
    Net forest depletion 
 
–2.9% 
–0.2% 
–0.0% 
Non-market valuations of: 
    Human health damages from particulates emissions 
    Discounted long-term economic losses from climate change caused by 
current anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
 
–0.2% 
 
–0.4% 
Total basic ANS ).( KP !    9.3% 
 
 
3.3. Another approach 
 
Another approach to empirical sustainability measurement has been developed 
from theory originated by Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), with notable recent 
contributions being Arrow et al. (2012) and UNU-IHDP and UNEP (2012).  This 
approach appears to measure sustainability in non-optimal economies, and thus avoid 
our problem of using a sustainability theory that applies only to optimal economies.  
But it actually offers no advantage for our purposes, because it generally defines an 
economy’s sustainability at t quite differently, as instantaneously non-declining 
welfare ( 0)( ≥tW!  at t).8  The approach then shows how 0)( ≥tW!  at t can translate in 
non-optimal economies into comprehensive wealth, measured at constant real prices, 
being non-declining at t; or into variants of ANS, called comprehensive investment in 
Arrow et al. and inclusive investment in UNU-IHDP, being non-negative at t.  So 
                                                
8 The original definition of sustainable development in Dasgupta and Mäler (2000: 83), though, was 
non-instantaneous: “...from now, utility must never decline”. 
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while many details of comprehensive investment calculations in the Dasgupta-based 
literature differ from the World Bank’s ANS calculations − in particular, Arrow et al. 
found huge values for health capital, which we do not include here − the theoretical 
link that one can then make with sustainability as defined in (4) is no different.  Both 
approaches also face the same problems of finding the shadow prices needed to 
estimate ANS (Smulders, 2012). 
 
 
4. Our modifications to DICE and to ANS 
 
4.1. Choosing the DICE-2007 model for modification 
 
 Fankhauser’s (1994) method of valuing CO2 emissions, as used in World Bank 
ANS, was designed for small-scale emission control projects, and cannot calculate 
SCCs under optimal or no emissions control, or corresponding values of technical 
progress.  Our requirement in (4) for all these values led us to modify DICE-2007 
(Nordhaus, 2008), one of the DICE/RICE series of IAMs including RICE-2010 
(Nordhaus, 2010, where R = Regional), DICE-2010, and DICE-2013 (Nordhaus, 
2013).  Each model assumes global welfare maximization, with or without control of 
industrial CO2 emissions, and includes exogenous technical progress.  So each can 
yield all our required values, in contrast to literature-based CO2 valuations (e.g., Tol, 
2009), or to most other IAMs.9  The relative simplicity and generally good 
documentation of DICE/RICE models further make them a suitable choice for our 
inductive method.  DICE-2007 is the most suitable, since RICE contains regional 
detail irrelevant to our global analysis, and neither DICE-2010 nor DICE-2013 was 
fully documented at the time of submission.10 
 
 DICE-2007’s SCC is close enough to cause no loss of accuracy when we use it in 
place of the World Bank’s SCC in our estimates of ANS based on standard DICE.  
                                                
9 WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2006 and subsequent papers) might be developed to yield the values needed 
for our approach, but far less readily than DICE. 
10 DICE-2013’s latest (October 2013) damage function is very close to DICE-2007’s. 
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Normalized to US2005$, SCC is $24.5/tC in World Bank (2011: 78); and $27.3/tC in 
2005 in DICE-2007’s optimal run (Nordhaus, 2008: 92), where optimality would 
require all policy-makers to create a uniform carbon price close to this SCC, using an 
emissions tax or trading scheme with 100% participation (i.e., covering all global 
emissions).  SCC is $28.9/tC in 2010 in RICE-2010’s optimal run, so using RICE 
would change little here.  Reasons for not using recent, probabilistic variants of DICE 
were given in Section 2.2. 
 
4.2. Modifying DICE inductively to revalue CO2 emissions 
 
 For reasons already discussed, we derive a precautionary SCC inductively, by 
modifying DICE so it becomes economically optimal for the world to be likely to stay 
within an agreed warming limit.  We choose the well-known 2 oC limit, and “likely” 
means “with about 70% probability” – near the bottom of the 66-90% range for 
“likely” used by IPCC (2007) – which allows us to use a result from probabilistic 
climate science to calibrate our deterministic method.  Like most IAM literature, we 
omit a detailed description of DICE, which is documented in Nordhaus (2008), with 
its computer code available in Nordhaus (2013).  For reasons given earlier, we use 
DICE’s “descriptive”, market values for discount rate parameters rather than any 
“prescriptive”, ethical values as in Stern (2007).  We make a likely, 2 oC warming 
limit optimal by changing three DICE elements: the climate damage function, ω(T); 
the path of non-CO2 radiative forcing over time t, labelled FEX(t); and the climate 
(temperature) sensitivity parameter, labelled χ; see Appendix C for the code used. 
 
 The relationship among these three changes needs explanation.  First, we do not 
just impose an exogenous 2 oC warming constraint as in Nordhaus (2008), because 2 
oC is too low to be optimal if DICE’s modest damage function in (2) is valid.  Next, 
we judge it insufficiently precautionary to modify only DICE’s damage function, 
because of results in column (b) of Table 2.  There we assume a temperature exponent 
N = 5 (the highest value considered by Ackerman et al., 2010, though Dietz and 
Asheim, 2012 considered N = 7) to give a damage curve with a steep threshold that 
embodies a precautionary approach to tipping elements in the climate system (Lenton 
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et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2011).  We then find by induction that a = 0.00072 
would make 2 oC maximum warming optimal, but would result in 1400 GtCO2 
cumulative CO2 emissions during 2000-50.  In a much-cited climate model 
(Meinshausen et al., 2009), such emissions are equivalent to only a ~55% chance of 
achieving a 2 oC maximum under uncertainty, which we consider not “likely” enough 
for risk-averse policy-makers. 
 
Table 2.  Our modifications to standard DICE assumptions and results 
 
 (a) Standard DICE (b) DICE with steeper 
damage as the only 
change in parameters 
(c) Our base-
case modified 
DICE 
Model parameters: 
Parameters in climate damage 
function (proportion of global 
GDP lost), 
ω(T) = aTN / (1+ aTN)          (1) 
N 2 5 5 
a   0.0028388 0.00072† 0.00082† 
Non-CO2 net radiative forcing, FEX(t) 
(t = (year–2005)/10) 
0.36 × [min(t/10,1)] 
– 0.06 
(Wm–2) 
0.36 × [min(t/10,1)] 
– 0.06 
(Wm–2) 
0.25 
× [min(t/10,1)] 
× CO2 forcing 
Climate sensitivity, χ (oC) 3 3 4 
Model results: 
Maximum global warming T if CO2 
emissions are optimal (oC)  
3.5 2.0† 2.0† 
Cumulative, optimally controlled 
CO2 emissions, 2000-50 (GtCO2) 
1670 1400 1110 
† In our modifications, maximum, global warming is an exogenous assumption, and parameter a is 
induced so that this maximum is economically optimal. 
 
 
We therefore make two extra changes, each supported by recent climate science, 
to lower the cumulative emissions that our modified DICE calculates as being 
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compatible with any given maximum warming.  We thus arrive at a precautionary 
recalibration of DICE, with a deterministic form of higher risk aversion (by achieving 
the equivalent of a ~70% chance of 2 oC maximum warming), as well as a higher 
climate damage function.   
 
One extra change is to non-CO2 net radiative forcing.  DICE’s FEX(t), which is 
not separately documented in Nordhaus (2007), is independent of the CO2 emissions 
path and results in non-CO2 forcing peaking at only 6-7% of CO2 forcing in 2105.  By 
contrast, IPCC (2007, Table 5.1) estimated that at stabilization, CO2-equivalent 
concentrations (including non-CO2 gases), closely reflecting overall radiative forcing, 
would over a wide range be at least 25% above CO2-only concentrations.  Our base-
case modified DICE, defined by column (c) of Table 2, matches this by assuming 
FEX(t) starts at zero in 2005, as in IPCC (2007), and rises to 25% of CO2 forcing in 
2105 and thereafter.  Higher, uncontrolled CO2 concentrations will thus be associated 
with higher non-CO2 forcing, rather than unchanged non-CO2 forcing as less plausibly 
assumed in DICE.  Our non-CO2 forcing turns out to be higher overall in the 
optimally controlled case as well (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Non-CO2 net radiative forcing in standard DICE and our modified DICE 
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Our last change is to raise climate sensitivity χ from 3 to 4 oC, which Sherwood 
et al. (2014: 40) concluded is the “most likely” value.  We then find by induction, still 
assuming N = 5, that our changes to FEX(t) and χ together change the damage function 
to ω(T) = .00082T5 / (1+.00082T5) and lower the 2000-50 emissions consistent with 2 
oC maximum warming down to ~1100 GtCO2, as shown in column (c).  Such 
cumulative emissions raise the chance in Meinshausen et al. of achieving a 2 oC limit 
to ~70%, as required.  In keeping with our interpretation that the 2 oC (or any similar) 
warming limit primarily reflects a policy of protecting future generations from climate 
damage, rather than encouraging higher general intergenerational concern, this 
function is much higher than DICE’s and other notable recent damage functions (Fig. 
4), and shows a strong threshold effect over a 3−5 oC warming range. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Global warming damage functions, ω(T).  Our modified DICE function is compared 
to those of Weitzman (2012), standard DICE (Nordhaus, 2007), and Stern (2007). 
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4.3. Adjustments to ANS for population growth and exogenous technical progress 
 
 We estimate that KP.n , the population deduction in (4), was 4.6% of global GDP 
in 2005, as follows: 
 Growth rate of global population in 2005, n = 1.19 %/yr (World Bank, 2013). 
 Tangible wealth per person, P(2005).K(2005)/L(2005) = 27.12 k$/person 
(World Bank, 2011: 181) 
 GDP per person in 2005 = 7.06 k$/person.yr (World Bank, 2013) 
 1.19% x 27.12 / 7.06 = 4.6%. 
 
 For reasons of data availability, the World Bank’s estimates of tangible wealth, 
)().( tt KP , are based on a different set of stocks, K, than used for their basic ANS, 
)().( tt KP !  (World Bank, 2011, Appendices D-E).  Human capital and environmental 
resource stocks, respectively changed by cumulative education expenditures and 
cumulative emissions, are excluded from tangible wealth, both for data reasons, and 
with an environmental stock like CO2 concentration because its effect per person is 
undiluted by population growth.  Data on tangible wealth are available only for 1995, 
2000, and 2005, which finally explains our choice of 2005 as our year of modified 
ANS calculations.  As discussed in Section 3.1, any difference in non-CO2 prices and 
quantities between paths with controlled and uncontrolled CO2 emissions is ignored 
here, and deserves future research. 
 
 The lack of appropriate data on overall technical progress makes estimating its 
current discounted value, x in (4), infeasible for many individual countries, but we can 
estimate a global x from DICE’s assumed growth in total factor productivity, as 
described in Appendix B.  Since x depends on not just exogenously growing total 
factor productivity, but also endogenous changes to manufactured capital resulting 
from past investment and depreciation, we can and do compute different values for x 
on paths with controlled and uncontrolled emissions, unlike with the cost of 
population growth. 
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 The number we finally add to ANS is not Lx/GDP, the percentage value of gross 
technical progress.  World Bank ANS already includes public education spending (a 
rough estimate of total education spending), estimated at 4.3% of global GDP in 2005, 
as a reclassification of spending from consumption to investment in human capital 
(Table 1).  Since human capital growth through education, a cause of total factor 
productivity growth (Solow, 1957), is not included in DICE’s manufactured capital, it 
must be already included in DICE’s productivity growth.  Including both education 
spending and all Lx/GDP in ANS would therefore be double-counting, so the 
technical progress values reported below are for (Lx/GDP – 4.3%). 
 
 
5. Results and sensitivity testing 
 
5.1. Results 
 
 Because of its modest damage function, standard DICE’s economic results and 
their application to ANS in Table 3 show very little difference between a future with 
optimal control of industrial CO2 emissions, where maximum global warming is 3.5 
oC, and a future with no control, where maximum warming is 6.1 oC.  By contrast, 
emissions control matters hugely in our modified DICE model, because of our 
changes in Table 2 that make a likely, 2 oC warming limit optimal. 
 
 If industrial emissions are controlled to respect this limit, then our base-case 
results in Table 3 value the current ANS emissions deduction at 2% of global GDP, 
about 4 times higher than the World Bank’s, but we also add 16% of GDP for future 
technical progress.  Our modified ANS is then 19%, markedly more reassuring about 
the sustainability of current, global well-being than the World Bank’s 9% in Table 1, 
mainly because of the included benefit of technical progress, which on an optimal 
path far outweighs the cost of population growth and our higher valuation of 
emissions.  Consistent with this, average well-being in 2105 is projected to be only 
4% below the standard DICE level (Fig. 5a), despite the extra cost of much faster CO2 
abatement. 
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Table 3.  Global climatic and economic results using standard DICE and our modified DICE 
over 2105-2595.  Cases (a) and (c) are as in Table 2, whose case (b) is irrelevant here. 
 (a) 
Stan-
dard 
DICE 
(c) Our 
base-case 
modified 
DICE 
Optimal control of industrial 
CO2 emissions 
Maximum global warming (oC) 3.5 2.0 
Social cost of CO2 emissions (SCC) 
in 2005 
($/tC) 27 131 
(% GDP)     –0.5 –2.2 
#Value of technical progress, as at 2005 (% GDP) 15.7 16.0 
##Adjusted Net Saving (ANS) in 2005 (% GDP) 20.5 19.0 
No control of industrial CO2 
emissions 
Maximum global warming (oC) 6.1 6.0 
SCC in 2005 
($/tC)     28 1455 
(% GDP) –0.5 –24.4 
#Value of technical progress, as at 2005 (% GDP) 15.6 7.2 
##ANS in 2005 (% GDP) 20.3 –12.0 
Decade of peak well-being in DICE None 2065 
#Net of 4.3% educational spending (see end of Section 4). 
##Sum of CO2 emissions and technical progress as shown here, plus 5.2% GDP for sum of net saving 
(8.7%), public education spending (4.3%), natural resource depletion (–3.1%) and particulates pollution 
(–0.2%) from Table 1, and of population growth (–4.6%) from Section 4.3. 
 
 
 
 But with no CO2 control, warming is much faster, so each ton of current emissions 
causes much more future damage.  This raises our deduction for current emissions 
another 11-fold, from 2% to 24% of global GDP; and owing to depressed future 
investment (Appendix B, Fig. 5b), it also lowers the sustainability value of technical 
progress to  only  7%.   Our  modified  ANS  in  2005 is then –12% of GDP (Table 3). 
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a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Average well-being (a) and gross investment per person (b) in our base-case modified 
DICE, on different vertical scales.  (Standard DICE graphs for No CO2 control are omitted 
because on them, well-being and investment are only 0.7% and 1.4% below Optimal in 2105.) 
 
 
Average human well-being is higher for the first two decades (Fig. 5a), but then 
grows more slowly and peaks in 2065, because climate damage eventually exceeds 
the benefits from capital investment and technical progress.  Given the absence of any 
theory-based alternative, this suggests that negative ANS may serve as a heuristic 
indicator of the unsustainability of an uncontrolled, business-as-usual development 
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path.  So on the basis of just Table 3’s results, our provisional answer to both our 
opening questions would be ‘yes’: with optimal environmental management, current 
well-being is found to be sustainable, even with a “strong” limit on global warming; 
but with uncontrolled environmental damage, the future rise in well-being is 
unsustainable.  Together these results would challenge the beliefs of both 
environmental pessimists and environmental optimists, and we can but hope such 
challenges would inspire some more nuanced debate between supporters of the two 
paradigms.  But given the many contentious assumptions on which our results rest, 
they first need to be tested, as follows. 
5.2. Sensitivity testing 
 DICE contains 44 non-trivial parameters (Nordhaus, 2008: 58). Anderson et al. 
(2014) used Monte Carlo simulations to perform a probabilistic, global sensitivity 
analysis on DICE, whereby all its parameters are varied simultaneously, with each 
assigned a uniform distribution from 10% below to 10% above its base value, and 
with all base values given equal standing.  In contrast to standard, one-factor-at-a-time 
analyses, this allows for interactions among parameters, and avoids prejudging which 
parameters are worth selecting for analysis.  However, the unavoidable uncertainty 
about what parameters to include in an IAM in the first place remains (Dietz and 
Fankhauser, 2010).  Also, using a uniform, non-judgmental approach to testing values 
for included parameters can discard some useful knowledge.  For example, some base 
values for parameters can be calibrated quite well against current observations, and 
are thus more reliably known than others; and credible ranges of variability may be 
much wider for some parameters than for others.  So while a global sensitivity 
analysis would undoubtedly be desirable, a good one is necessarily complex, and we 
leave these complexities to future research.  Instead we have used our judgment to 
choose parameters that define the eight, one-factor-at-a-time tests shown in columns 
(d)-(k) of Table 4, which are ranked in descending order of impact on no-control ANS 
compared to our base case in column (c). 
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Table 1.  Sensitivity tests of our modified DICE model results. Case (c) is as in Table 2.  Notes on technical progress and ANS results are as in Table 3. 
(c) Base 
case of 
our mod-
ified 
DICE 
(d) 
Higher 
warming 
limit: 
2.2 not 
2.0 oC 
(e) Lower 
climate 
sensitivity: 
χ = 3.6 not 
4 oC 
(f) Higher 
capital 
elasticity 
of output: 
γ = 0.33 
not 0.3 
(g) Total 
factor 
product'y 
A always 
10% 
lower 
(h) Lower 
damage 
exponent: 
N = 4.5 
not 5 
(i) Lower 
part-
icipation 
rate: 90% 
not 100% 
(j) Lower 
cons-
umption 
elasticity
: α = 1.8 
not 2 
(k) Faster 
technical 
progress: 
GA0 = 
0.101 not 
0.092 
Optimal 
control of 
industrial 
CO2 
emissions 
Social cost of 
CO2 emissions 
(SCC) in 2005 
($/tC) 131 97 108 105 121 136 160 134 127 
(% GDP) –2.2 –1.6 –1.8 −1.8 −2.0 –2.3 –2.7 −2.2 –2.1
Value of technical progress, as 
at 2005 (% GDP) 16.0 15.9 15.9 15.4 18.7 16.0 16.0 17.1 20.0 
Adjusted Net 
Saving (ANS) 
in 2005
(% GDP) 19.0 19.4 19.3 18.8 21.9 18.9 18.4 20.0 23.1 
Rank re (c)* – 5 6 7 2 8 4 3 1 
No control 
of 
industrial 
CO2 
emissions 
SCC in 2005 
($/tC) 1455   801 901 929 1053   976 1872 1310 1460 
(% GDP) –24.4 –13.4 –15.1 −15.6 −17.7 –16.4 –31.4 −22.0 –24.5
Value of technical progress, as 
at 2005 (% GDP) 7.2 8.6 8.3 8.0 9.8 8.2 6.6 7.7 10.1 
ANS in 2005
(% GDP) –12.0 0.4 −1.6 −2.4 −2.7 −2.9 –19.6 −9.1 –9.2
Rank re (c)* – 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Decade of peak well-being in 
modified DICE 2065 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 2065 2075 2065 
* Ranked in descending order of % GDP change from no-control ANS in (c) (so No-control ANS is least sensitive to a 10% change in parameter (k), ranked 8).
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 Our choice was nevertheless mainly inspired by Anderson et al.’s method and 
results.  First, each of our eight parameters is changed by 10% from its base value in 
our modified DICE, with the changes all chosen to improve no-control ANS, except 
for the emissions-pricing participation rate (column (i)), which cannot be improved 
from its initial level of 100%.  Second, the five parameters which define columns (e)-
(h) and (j) are those with the most impact on optimal SCC in Anderson et al.’s analysis 
(excluding a in Table 2, which we always determine inductively so that the warming 
limit is still optimal).  Two further parameters − the warming limit in (d), and the rate 
of technical progress in (k) − were of obvious interest, given their role in our ANS 
methodology.  Our eighth parameter was the participation rate.  We found ANS to be 
quite sensitive to this, even though it was one of the least sensitive parameters in 
Anderson et al.’s analysis which started from DICE’s standard values for the damage 
parameters N and a.  Moreover, a halved participation rate seems much more likely 
and thus worth considering than, say, a doubled total factor productivity, which again 
shows the limits of a strictly non-judgmental approach to sensitivity analysis. 
 Our tests all show large differences between optimal and no-control SCCs, and 
between optimal and no-control ANSs.  This is reassuring for our methodology, if 
unsurprising given how much higher climate damage is in our modified DICE than in 
conventional models.  The smallest difference between optimal and no-control ANSs is 
19 percentage points, in (d) where the warming limit is 2.2 oC.  This higher limit nearly 
halves the no-control SCC and causes the greatest change in no-control ANS from our 
base case (c), making it just positive.  However, Table 4’s last row shows that in (d), 
peak well-being in modified DICE is delayed by only a decade, rather than avoided, 
suggesting only a one-sided link between ANS and sustainability also in the no-control 
case. 
 Despite no-control ANS being most sensitive in our tests to two climate-related 
parameters (the warming limit in (d), followed by climate sensitivity in (e)), two 
economic parameters (capital elasticity in (f) and total factor productivity in (g)) are 
close behind, suggesting no particularly sharp focus on which parameters deserve top 
priority in future research.  Moreover, sensitivity depends on the policy question 
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considered to be of interest.  The rank order of sensitivity of ANS is very different 
between optimal control and no control, with some changes in ANS from base case (c) 
even having opposite sign for optimal and no-control runs, as with cases (f) and (h).  
The rank order of sensitivity is different again if SCC (CO2 control) rather than ANS 
(global sustainability) is of interest.  For example, a 10% change in the rate of technical 
progress, (k), has the least effect on no-control ANS and the second-least effect on 
controlled SCC, but the greatest effect on controlled ANS. 
 
 
6. Can ANS use induction to include other global environmental concerns? 
 
Here we consider if ANS might be further extended to include other major 
environmental concerns for global sustainability, such as Rockstrom et al.’s (2009) 
“planetary boundaries”.  A full treatment would need another paper, and references 
here are merely illustrative.  Nevertheless, considering biodiversity loss, and 
conversion of atmospheric nitrogen to reactive forms – judged by Rockstrom et al. to 
be the two most exceeded planetary boundaries – together with food security, suggests 
some potential for our inductive approach to make ANS yet more inclusive, but also 
the great difficulties of doing so.  More straightforward, non-inductive extensions 
would also be possible, such as including intragenerational inequality via regional 
disaggregation (e.g., after Nordhaus, 2010), endogenous technical change (e.g., after 
Popp, 2004), or carbon-cycle feedback (as suggested by Hof et al., 2012). 
 
Inclusion of any new environmental variable i in ANS requires an estimate of both 
its current net stock change, iK! , and its current, discounted social value per unit, iP .  
Such estimates for global biodiversity loss are conceivable by developing a loss model 
like that in Braat and ten Brink (2008), which uses population, GDP, energy use, and 
food production as drivers.  A precautionary value might then be induced from an 
exogenous, “strong sustainability” limit on biodiversity loss, similar to our induction of 
a precautionary CO2 value.  But unlike CO2 emissions, biodiversity is heterogeneous, 
with Braat and ten Brink’s use of mean species abundance as its aggregate measure 
contrasting with Rockstrom et al.’s use of total species number.  As for atmospheric 
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nitrogen conversion, this flow is measurable, but as yet there is no global modeling of 
its determinants.  So including nitrogen in ANS, even inductively, is even further off. 
 
 Growing concern is also being expressed (e.g., by Godfray et al., 2010) about the 
world’s future ability to feed its population, and hence about sustainability as defined 
here since food is vital to well-being.  But by contrast with biodiversity loss and 
nitrogen pollution, food production and consumption are mainly marketed, hence 
already represented, albeit imperfectly, in our modified ANS.  For example, the World 
Bank (2011) estimates of KP.n  in (4) include market values for four categories of 
rural and urban land (say P1K1,...,P4K4), and thus how population growth cuts food 
supply per person ceteris paribus by cutting land available per person.  However, net 
changes in quality-adjusted land stocks, ),...,( 41 KK !! , are not available separately (World 
Bank, 2011: 38) and so are excluded.  By contrast, phosphate rock is included in 
ANS’s mineral depletion term (Table 1), so its valuation there at much less than 0.2% 
of global GDP lends no support to Cordell et al.’s (2009) grave concern about the 
effect of future phosphorus depletion on global food security.  Supporting this concern 
within a modified ANS would require a calculation, perhaps using an extended IAM, 
that the ultimate non-substitutability of phosphate fertilizer in food production implies 
a sustainability price (Pezzey and Toman, 2002) vastly bigger than the market-based 
rental price currently used in World Bank ANS. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
More than two centuries after Malthus started the debate on the limits that finite 
environmental resources and population growth impose on the long-term, sustainable 
growth of human well-being, there is a persistent gulf between optimistic and 
pessimistic views on such limits and the indicators supporting them.  Economic 
(“weak”) indicators like the World Bank’s Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) and physical 
(“strong”) indicators like the Ecological Footprint suggest starkly different, 
respectively optimistic and pessimistic, futures for the world, and in particular attach 
vastly different importance to current CO2 emissions.  The Earth’s uniqueness, and the 
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complexity and long time-scales of key global changes, mean that many limits of 
substituting human-made for environmental inputs to well-being are, and will stay, 
highly unknowable.  Opposing views on global sustainability will thus tend to remain 
beliefs or paradigms, whose disagreement cannot be resolved by normal scientific 
methods. 
 
To address this gulf and help inform policy-making on global sustainability issues, 
we have constructed an experimental, more inclusive, hybrid (“weak/strong”) indicator 
of global sustainability.  We extended World Bank ANS to include two important 
omitted features – the cost of exogenous population growth and benefit of exogenous 
technical progress – and replaced the CO2 emissions valuation by either one of two, 
much higher, precautionary valuations, which assume either optimally controlled or 
uncontrolled future emissions.  Because damage from future global warming is highly 
unknowable, we calculated these valuations inductively: we modified the damage, 
climate sensitivity, and non-CO2 forcing assumptions in the deterministic, DICE 
integrated assessment model so that an emissions path likely to limit global warming to 
2 oC (an agreed “strong sustainability” constraint which is known) becomes 
economically optimal.  And to focus on climate damage rather than general 
intergenerational concern as the main driver of climate policy, we left discount rates 
unchanged at market-based, policy-relevant values.  However, such induction does not 
make the cost of exceeding 2 oC warming infinite, as logically implied by the language 
of (absolute) non-substitutability used in much “strong sustainability” writing. 
 
If future CO2 emissions are optimally controlled, our base-case, modified ANS is 
substantially higher than World Bank ANS, mainly thanks to including the benefit of 
exogenous technical progress.  Consistent with this, our modified-DICE model has 
well-being growth very close to DICE’s original.  But if emissions are uncontrolled, 
our CO2 cost is much higher than the World Bank’s, (exogenous) technical progress is 
less beneficial because (endogenous) future investment falls, and base-case ANS is 
negative.  Consistent with this, well-being in modified-DICE peaks in 2065, 
contradicting the conventional economic expectation of limitless growth.  This 
suggests that a negative “uncontrolled ANS” – one using valuations based on a future 
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path of uncontrolled environmental damage – may be a useful, if heuristic, indicator of 
the unsustainability of rising well-being on that path.  Our results are sensitive to 
changes in parameter values, but none of eight key parameters tested was much more 
important than the others, though the warming limit used for induction, still deserves 
special scrutiny.  Also, which parameters are considered the most important depends 
on the policy context of interest (climate policy or global sustainability, controlled or 
uncontrolled scenarios). 
 
Our highly provisional answers to our two opening questions would thus be that the 
current level of well-being may be sustainable if the global economy and environment 
are optimally controlled in future; but rising well-being may not be sustained for 
another century or so if business-as-usual trends of largely uncontrolled environmental 
depletion continue.  Such results depend on unavoidably contentious assumptions, and 
we regard our contribution here as being perhaps more our methodology than our base-
case results, though our results do show how carefully qualified optimistic and 
pessimistic views on global sustainability can both be right.  How well the global 
environment will in fact be controlled is a separate issue, though, on which optimistic 
or pessimistic views may be held independently. 
 
Several topics remain for future research.  An important but tough challenge would 
be to use induction to include “planetary boundaries” for other global environmental 
threats in ANS, like biodiversity loss and nitrogen pollution, which are also 
unknowable enough to be near-impossible to value directly.  An easier extension in 
terms of data-gathering, but perhaps harder computationally, would be to use induction 
in existing, probabilistic versions of DICE which explicitly model important aspects of 
uncertainty (as opposed to unknowability) that our deterministic approach omits, like 
policy-makers’ risk aversion.  Adding carbon-cycle feedback, endogenous population 
change, and endogenous technical progress would also be desirable.  The ultimate aim 
might be to extend such a model even further to include important sectors like energy 
and minerals depletion, so the model could then be used to make direct predictions of 
global sustainability, not just provide values for a hybrid ANS as here.  However, a 
separate, more complete model might actually have less influence on policy than a 
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further modification of World Bank ANS.  The theoretical, data-gathering, and 
modelling challenges of all such extensions are severe, so multiple, simpler 
sustainability indicators will still be needed.  But we hope our attempt to build a single, 
more inclusive, economic indicator of global sustainability which incorporates both 
technical progress and a physical, environmental constraint will be of interest to 
policy-makers, and a useful addition to the mostly polarized debate between 
environmental optimists and pessimists. 
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Appendix A.  Further details of ANS theory 
 
 Pezzey’s (2004) theoretical link between extended ANS and sustainability in (4) is 
summarized as follows.  Society’s intertemporal welfare W(0) is the discounted present 
value of average utility (well-being) per person weighted by population: 
 ∫
∞ −=
0
 )](/)([ )(:  )0( dtetLtutLW tρC ,                      (A.1) 
and four key restrictive conditions for result (4) to hold are: 
• C(t) is “extended consumption”, the vector of all attributes, including consumption of 
goods and services and various measures of environmental quality, whose per-person 
levels determine a representative agent’s instantaneous utility, u(C/L); 
• L(t) = L0 ent is population, assumed to be growing exogenously at constant rate n; 
 • ρ > 0, the utility (pure time) discount rate is constant; and 
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• W(0) is maximized subject to ]),(),([)](),([ ttLtStt KKC ∈!  at all times, where S[.], 
the economy’s “extended production” possibility set, has constant returns to scale, 
and is non-autonomous (depends directly on time t) to allow for exogenous technical 
progress. 
 
 Term x(t) in (4), the per-person realized value of exogenous technical progress in 
expanding production possibilities over time, is: 
 x (t) ∫ ∫
∞
−−∂∂=
  
  
  
  
 }])([ exp{ ]/)([:
t
s
t
dsdznzrssy ,              (A.2) 
where y(t) is (green) Net National Product per person and r(t) is the real interest rate at 
time t (see Propositions 5 and 8 in Pezzey, 2004, which generalize and extend 
Weitzman, 1997).  Appendix B explains how we estimate x(t) empirically. 
 
 In addition to, or derived from, the four key conditions already noted, further 
assumptions needed to make (4) true include that: 
(i) all decision-makers have perfect information over an infinite time horizon, and 
social planners use this to make the economy follow its optimal path over time; 
(ii) the optimal time-path of utility is unique and non-constant; 
(iii) all stocks affecting production and utility, K, and net investments in them, K! , are 
measurable; 
(iv) all such stocks have finite prices, P, which in turn assumes smooth 
substitutability everywhere between human-made inputs and natural inputs to 
production and utility; 
(v) by measuring the welfare of just a representative agent, and discounting it over 
all time, all decision-makers are ethically willing to aggregate dollar values over 
all present and future people, and ignore all intranational, international, and 
intergenerational inequalities in well-being; 
(vi) there are no public goods or bads (since the effect of these on utility would not be 
divided by population L as in (A.1), as noted in Pezzey 2004: 625); and 
(vii) there are no renewable resource stocks with non-constant returns to scale. 
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Appendix B.  Using DICE to estimate the ANS addition for technical progress 
 
 We estimate the per-person value x(0) of exogenous technical progress using this 
discrete approximation of (A.2) applied to results from DICE runs: 
    x(t) ∑ ∑= = −−ΔΔ≈
18 })]()([10exp{]/)(~[
ts
s
tz
dsdzznzrssy ,               (B.1) 
with t in decades as in DICE, but with r and n as annual rates, hence the required factor 
of 10.  This approximates y, green Net National Product per person, as y~ , per-person 
output, net of climate damage ω and manufactured capital depreciation δK: 
   )(/)}()](1[)]([)]()[({:)(~ 1 sLsKTsLsKsAsy δωγγ −−= −              (B.2) 
where previously undefined terms in DICE are two variables: (exogenous) total factor 
productivity A(t) and (endogenous) manufactured capital K(t); and two parameters: γ, 
the capital elasticity of Cobb-Douglas gross output, and δ, the rate of capital 
depreciation. 
 
 To compute Δ y~ (s)/Δs in (B.1), we start by computing annual growth rates of 
population and technology for t = 0, ...,18 (i.e. from 2005-2185) as 
    n(t) = [L(t+1)/L(t)]1/10 – 1   and    gA(t) := [A(t+1)/A(t)]1/10 – 1,   respectively,    (B.3) 
so the growth rate in y~ (t) due solely to technical progress is 
   [Δ y~ (t)/Δt]/ y~ (t) = gA(t)–n(t),   and   Δ y~ (s)/Δs   in (B.1) is  [gA(s)–n(s)] y~ (s).     (B.4) 
Next, we compute the geometric, annual rate of interest 
 r(z) := [1+r10(z)]1/10 – 1,                   (B.5) 
where r10(z) is the decadal interest rate computed by DICE. 
 
 We finally estimate x(0) from (B.1).  This is much lower on the no-control path 
than on the optimal path, because with no control, in anticipation of much higher 
climate damage, investment falls rather than rises over time (Fig. 5b).  This leads to 
falling rather than rising capital, hence higher interest rates r and heavier discounting 
in (B.1). 
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Appendix C.  Our modifications to DICE’s computer code 
 
Original lines of GAMS code for DICE-2007 
 
T2XCO2  Equilibrium temp impact of CO2 doubling oC / 3      / 
FEX0  Estimate of 2000 forcings of non-CO2 GHG / -.06   / 
FEX1  Estimate of 2100 forcings of non-CO2 GHG / 0.30   / 
A2   Damage quadratic term                            / 0.0028388 / 
A3  Damage exponent                                  / 2.00      / 
FORCOTH(T) = FEX0 + .1*(FEX1-FEX0)*(ORD(T)-1)$(ORD(T)LT12) +  
0.36$(ORD(T)GE12); 
FORC(T) =E= FCO22X*((log((Matav(T)+.000001)/596.4)/log(2))) + FORCOTH(T); 
*s.fx("1") = .22; 
[The last line is from Nordhaus’s code, with * meaning that fixing the first-period 
saving rate s at 22% should be suppressed.  However, experimentation shows that to 
get the exact results shown in Nordhaus (2008), the command s.fx("1")=.22; must not 
be suppressed, so we make it operational in our modified DICE, as shown below.] 
 
Replacement lines in our modified DICE (Table 2, column (c)) 
 
T2XCO2  Equilibrium temp impact of CO2 doubling oC / 4      / 
A2   Damage quadratic term                            / 0.00082 / 
A3  Damage exponent                                  / 5.00      / 
FORCOTHM(T) = 0.025*(ORD(T)-1)$(ORD(T)LT12) + 0.25$(ORD(T)GE12); 
FORC(T) =E= FCO22X*((log((Matav(T)+.000001)/596.4)/log(2))) * 
FORCOTHM(T); 
s.fx("1") = .22; 
 
-oOo- 
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